In the 20th century the social transformations which followed the acts of armed insurrections and seizure of political power have changed the conditions of life of nearly half of humanity. Does this mean that the revolution itself, i.e. understood as a social change or restructuring, is actually the social and political practices of the `peaceful' period after all the barricades or palaces have been taken? If so, then these practices can tell us more about the nature of revolution than detailed analysis of people's behaviour and sentiments in the moment of insurrection.
Moreover, it prompts the idea that the traditional way of posing the question \*- why people revolt, or why this or that political party managed to seize power \*- can be changed to the following: what were the conditions of possibility of emergence of the same social and political practices in different countries and cultures? What was the common origin of these new practices? Revolution, then, should be understood in terms of its consequences, which, nevertheless were not predetermined in its origin.
So, the general task is to question and to analyse those concepts which are seemingly self-evident and are taken-for-granted and with which both revolutionaries and scientists usually start. This task is genealogical. Genealogy is a critical approach, which radically shifts the perspective. Nietzschean genealogical analysis of morality, for example, refuses to rely upon traditional terms and concepts (morality, truth, good) upon which the human world seems to be based. The analysis "proceeds by establishing the elements that are included in moral systems generally, the relevant historical facts and their conditions \*- among which he cites specific ages and epochs, various kinds of peoples, different types of individuals and their respective stratification"(Allison (ed.) 1985: xx). Thus morality, which before was itself a standpoint and an absolute, is held as a human instrument in the power game.
Genealogy de-bunks teleology by "attacking the Hegelian assumption, that the basis for major intellectual social or political changes lies in any single...transformation which all such changes consequently and variously express"(Minson 1985: 18). Thus, it deals with reality, with that which is given on the surface, avoiding the search for depth. Rather, the search and the obsession with depth and hidden meanings is accessible for explanation, once the observer distances himself from cultural belief in deep meaning. Genealogy "finds recurrences and play where others found progress and seriousness"(Dreyfus et al. 1982: 106).
In its recent development by Foucault, genealogy has received its linguistic or discursive colouring in addition to the traditional Nietzschean preoccupation with the problematics of power. The pragmatical side of language and the subject-constituting function of knowledge, which were once in the background, now seem to occupy the central place in local histories of various social phenomena. Genealogy, as Foucault holds it, "seeks to demonstrate the interweaving of what is said with what is done, of reasons with prescriptions, of effects of verediction with effects of jurisdiction" (Baynes et al. (eds) 1988: 97).
The stock of theories of revolution offered by social science is broad and diverse. Existing explanations usually deal with revolution as the prophecy of Marx. It is surprising, however, that many of them, claiming themselves to be Marxist or non-Marxist, use the logic and method of the prophecy to explain the prophecy itself. A range of statements, from simple political statements (such as Lenin's that "The theory of Marx is omnipowerful because it is true"), to sophisticated scientific texts, dealing with the materialistic logic of the objective laws of history, the development of industrial forces, class conflict and other elements of Marx's prophecy, seem to have a pre-programmed result: namely, that Marx was right and the prophecy came true; or he was wrong, because he failed or could not consider factors in industrial development, or class relations, or conditions which led to the failure of the prophecy. Even if Marxism does not fit the objective progress of history, or the new model of class structure, the basic logic of Marxism is nevertheless restored. Marxism is treated as a causal model, to be tested.
What is at issue therefore, is to discuss Marxism as a part of the reality of revolution, rather than to rely on it for an explanation of revolutions which, themselves, were strongly saturated with Marxist discourse. But first, let us see how the theories, which themselves claim to modify the Marxist approach, develop their `anti-Marxist' argument.
The book by Kumar The Rise of Modern Society, since it deals with modernity, includes a special chapter devoted to 20th century revolutions. The matter in question here is whether these revolutions were foreseen by Marx and are of Marxist origins, or whether they reveal a quite different character due to different material conditions, so that their Marxist claims are "a serious case of mystification"(Kumar 1988: 176). Kumar seems to show the latter, initially, by arguing that the class base of the 20th century revolutions substantially differed from those described by Marx \*- they were peasant revolutions, "and Marxism simply has no real insight to offer on peasant-based revolutions"(ibid: 171). Of course, not. But it offered something more general that was grasped by Lenin, Mao, Castro and all revolutionary figures \*- one must always look for the class that has nothing to lose and everything to win, or in other words, one has to look for a class (or social) base for revolution, \*- and they searched for it as carefully as scholars later searched for it in an attempt to explain the revolution.
Kumar claims, that "no acceptable general theory of peasant revolutions yet exists" (ibid: 185). But what is really meant here is the historical action of revolution \*- revolution taken as an event with a concrete date \*- 1917, 1948, 1954, 1958, etc. If so, then how can we really find a theoretical origin (and explanation, at the same time) of a unique composition of different circumstances in different cultures? But as soon as we consider social and political practice as a class based strategy, it is obvious that there are similarities \*- all one has to do is to locate its basic elements according to the historical situation. So, when Castro claims, that "The city is a cemetery of revolutionaries and resources" he reverses the Marxist thesis, but it does not move him away from the basic concept of creating a new model society which has to evolve through revolution.
Kumar assumes, that "the Marxist ideological colouring of the most of revolutions" is due to intellectuals who were educated in the West and absorbed the theory of Marx. But then, again, we have to pose the question omitted by Kumar: why was the `colouring' of most revolutions necessarily Marxist? This means that I will try to treat the role of Marxism not as some kind of trickery, but rather as a reality which was reproduced in its basic structure by most of the socialist countries.
Marxism should be not taken as method, but rather observed in the terrain of the phenomena to be explained. Therefore the task is not to look at how the social classes taken from the Marxist model act in history, but how the model or interpretation itself is used to make actual politics.
A causal explanation scheme favoured by many scholars also incorporates elements of the Marxist discourse. Revolution is seen as a result or a culmination of some preceding evolution, be it a rapid industrialisation which causes social disturbance and deprivation, or a struggle between different interest groups leading to the disintegration of power and to revolutionary anarchy. In general, some independent objective circumstances govern the overall course of historical events to which politicians have to adapt. Although there is no reason to negate the use of such schemes, what they really lack is the capacity to explain the emergence of recurrent social and political practices out of different combinations of historical roads and circumstances of the 20th century revolutions. I presume that there is a need, therefore, to look at revolutionary phenomena from the standpoint of subsequent social and political practices which have their roots in modernity. If we are to search for continuity, linking post- and pre-revolutionary history, we should consider the development of a particular knowledge and its implications.
The Copernican revolution in a broad sense could be considered as a starting point for the emergence of a new paradigm for understanding man's position within nature and society \*- one can never place trust upon beliefs, or sensations; rational knowledge precedes practical action and monitors human experience. The all-embracing physical world view of Newton's science, backed by the philosophical systems of Descartes and Bacon was given the role of liberating man from natural bonds. Thus, the so-called European subject was constituted as opposed to nature, and the core of the new Enlightenment epistemology was therefore subject/object opposition. Once nature became calculable the 17th century system of rational knowledge provided the mastery of human reason over nature.
Later, Kant, when he created the epistemological system of the natural sciences, concluded that this Copernican revolution, opposing human to non-human (i.e. distancing man from nature), could not happen in relation to society. Reason is not able to take a position outside the human world as this is basically the position of God, and therefore beyond the capabilities of reason (as scientific logic).
This breakthrough, which Kant considered to be impossible, started with the French revolution and the philosophy of Fichte. Copernicus attributed the ostensible turning of the firmament to the actual turning of the observer. Kant and Fichte attributed the causal order of the world to the way in which the subject must conceive the world. But only with Fichte did the doctrine that "the World is My Idea" obtain its social (or supersensual and non-natural) dimension. "The sole end of reason is pure activity by itself alone, having no need for any instrument outside of itself \*- independent of everything which is not reason, absolutely unconditioned" (Fichte 1965:124). But is there any place for unconditioned reason within society? This must be then a standpoint from which `free will' itself (which coincides with reason, according to Fichte) could be the object of mastering reason. After 1793 this standpoint was found in the revolution \*- the sun around which reason would make everything revolve. "My mind is forever closed to confusion and perplexity, to uncertainty, doubt and anxiety"\*- this Fichtean statement became the ruling principle of revolutionary reason itself. Once society was taken as an object of unconditioned reason, it became thereafter causal, calculable and was conceived as something which could be the object of practical experiment.
After Fichte, Hegel formulated a fundamental all-embracing rational philosophic system which was the first to relate to social practice. This notion has been developed in several contemporary studies by Merleau-Ponty, Popper, Glucksmann, Camus to name a few. Here I shall briefly reproduce those inventions of Hegel which later provided the general framework of thinking and acting inherent to modern revolutions.
The Hegelian concept of identity offered a convincing pattern of logic promoting the submission of reality to reason, or this is, at least, a lesson which was learned from him . In Philosophy of Right he formulated a basic proposition: "What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational" and "to comprehend what is, this is the task of philosophy, because what is, is reason". This can be interpreted as follows: truth develops in the same way as reason develops, and everything that appeals to reason in its latest stage must be true. "Provided you are up to date, all you need is to believe in a doctrine; this makes it, by definition true" (Popper 1990: 41). A political doctrine or revolutionary strategy if based on such logic can justify the social reality it creates by the mere authority of its own rational nature. "Reason does not go into the desert as anchorites do: it thrusts the desert before it, devastating things and men driving Beauty to desperation in order to subject everything to its force" (Glucksmann 1980: 177).
The Hegelian concept of `history' and of the dialectical movement of `subject' through history has to be mentioned here for it has provided meaning to history, treating it as an independent and objective movement. The culmination of this movement comes when subject (or absolute `spirit') merges its `object' on the stage of `absolute knowledge'. For Hegel this subject-object realisation is to be found in the state which allows an individual to live a universal life. The universal class which is for Hegel the true agent of history is represented therefore by state servants, whereas Marx later attributed this role to the proletariat with its historical mission. "Capital is a concrete Phenomenology of Mind," \*- remarks Merleau-Ponty, \*-" ...there can be no definite understanding of the whole import of Marxist politics without going back to Hegel's description of the fundamental relations between men" (1969; 101-2).
If history is only an inevitable process of becoming of what will realise itself as an actuality in the end of history, then the current practice is to receive its justification from the future. Moreover, transformative activity (renamed later more concretely, as revolutionary praxis) is recognised as a means of acknowledging of tuality, leaving no gap between theoretical and practical knowledge So when Marx reverses the Hegelian statement, claiming that philosophy should change the world, doubt no longer exists of the very possibility of such an action.
If society is to be an object of transformation, then, obviously the knowledge of how society is organised must be available. Placing Hegelian dialectics onto materialistic grounds for both the starting point of his method (material production) and object of his study (mainly 19th century western society) Marx "becomes operational on the grand scale: he offers a strategic grid for deciphering, and so for organising, the major conflicts of the modern world"(Glucksmann 1980: 210).
Marx's view of socio-historical dynamics presupposes economically determined and thus unfree human action which dialectically contains its negation \*- unconditioned and free action (at the stage of subject/object synthesis). So, Marxism is operational in the sense that it can be transformed into the knowledge of "What is to be done" (Lenin), offering both the demand for revolutionary action and the legitimation of such an action in terms of historical inevitability. Here I need to review two main axes of Marx's `grid' \*- labour/capital opposition and the concept of history which contains the notion of universal class acting as an agent of history beyond the end of history itself.
For Marx, society is first and foremost its economic system which is dominated by capital. Its source, lying in the possibility of appropriating a certain amount of labour via the organisation of production in the capitalist factory, is the starting point in scientific analysis, but not in reality itself. For actually, capital turns out to be an omnipresent totality, a power that brings together the mass of instruments and the labour force of society, and is therefore the basic precondition of every particular system of production and the extraction of surplus value. Such an extraction of surplus value is possible only if concrete labour is depersonalised and expressed as abstract labour alienated from the worker. And only afterwards it again receives its concrete form in wage, profit and production costs. Existing both in relation to itself and as property, constituting the class of exploiters, capital has another crucial consequence. By abstracting diverse forms of concrete labour and organising the value-creating process it produces another totality \*- labour as a social substance. So labour constitutes a class of the exploited. Finally society is found by Marx to be divided on a global scale: labour is opposed to capital, and the working class is opposed to the class of capitalists. In each pair of oppositions, the first element is dominated and robbed by the second on the global scale, so that local attempts at emancipation or partial improvements are doomed: there can be no salvation other than the central `showdown' with pital. The struggle must be of the same global scale; a liberation strategy that does not embrace the whole of the social system has no chance of success. t is impossible to grasp either labour or capital except as `grand narratives'. But both of them can become `really' real through the reality of violent confrontation and revolutionary struggle.
Marx claimed that his understanding of history could be referred to as dialectical materialism, as opposed to the Hegelian dialectics of spirit. He ascribed to the economic component of society, the quality of history in itself. "As it becomes material, the dialectic must grow heavy," \*- says Merleau-Ponty, \*- "...in Marx spirit becomes a thing, while things become saturated with spirit" (1973: 33). So, man is bounded in his natural conditions and the results of his own activity are opposed to him. Under capitalism the conditions of life and labour activity of the majority are alienated from it and the results of production are opposed to productive class in the form of commodities, capital and wages. Man is then governed by the historical conditions of his activity. This is pre-history, which is finite.
The key opposition of historical materialism is therefore that between pre-history (the kingdom of necessity) and history (or `true' history, which is the kingdom of freedom, Hegelian dialectical synthesis, Fichtean unconditioned reason). Pre-history produces the proletariat \*- a universal class; its objective historical drive is prophesied to be the seizure of power over production and hence, clearly understanding and restructuring the foundations of its existence. Understanding is to be acquired in the form of scientific knowledge. This idea of historical mission of the proletariat obviously cannot be realised without enlightenment and the encouragement of the latter: but as history is fatal and irreversible, this is not a matter of free will, but of ultimate moral duty to humanity.
These three figures are chosen not simply because they are linked to each other and continue to be impressively influential; they reveal throughout their universal systems something very important: a new status of truth. Now truth can be possesed, or rather formed, as such, only as a result of the employment of specific rules of its production \*- those of rational scientific acknowledgement. They are thereafter beyond perception and personal experience, as is truth itself \*- `out there'. The matter is that truth is to be discovered, as it is veiled and located behind the `smoke-screen' of either perceptive judgement or class interests. Neither the divine, nor tradition are essential for the new "regime of truth" (Foucault), but the rules of science. Moreover, this truth is not neutral: it is pragmatic, prescribing an action.
At this point it is possible to put forward the notion that the set of ideas generated in the 18th and19th centuries, especially in the writings of Fichte, Hegel and Marx, corresponded to the political and social practices which unfolded with the 20th century revolutions. Moreover, some of these ideas formed an institution of rational knowledge which is the basic element of what is now referred to as historicity or the self-production of society.
In The Self-production of Society Touraine presents a concept of society, the essential quality of which is acting upon itself. He terms it `historicity'. The latter is the capability to "construct a system of knowledge together with technical tools which it can use to intervene in its own functioning"(Touraine 1977: 15). Such a knowledge creates an image of the world which gives meaning to material situation and "fills ... the gap, the distance, separating the production of society from the reproduction of its activity" (ibid: 26). We can suppose that Touraine speaks of a modern society: he uses the term `primitive society' (that coincides with its own rules of functioning, whereas a self-produced one does not) and opposes a contemplative character of knowledge (logos) in society with weak historicity to knowledge, recognised as a force of direct transformation (praxis) producing a high degree of historicity. The author tends to avoid the `idealism/materialism' opposition as he finds none of these approaches capable of an adequate understanding of modern society: "historicity is neither idea nor material situation; it is the specific characteristic of social action, which constitutes its experience through the meaning it gives to it" (ibid: 17).
The scale of this article restrains me from analysing the details of Touraine's concrete analysis of how the self-production of society is performed through social institutions and social movements. But what is important here is that his notion strikingly resembles Marx's idea of the end of pre-history when man consciously creates his own history in the `kingdom of freedom'. But what Marx spoke of as distant future, Touraine treats as a real state of affairs.
Giddens in his work The Consequences of Modernity singles out reflexivity as an important feature of modernity in the social sense. He describes it in a way that "social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices, thus constitutively altering their character. [(...)] All forms of social life are partly constituted by actors' knowledge of them" (Giddens 1990: 38). So social knowledge does play a certain role in making history. Giddens even directly quotes Marx's idea of "using history to make history" which happens when findings of social science are filtered through the self-understanding of social agents. The author relies on this idea to define what modernity is. But nevertheless Giddens employs the notion of the unintended consequences of social action as a factor that restrains human control over the functioning ofthe social system.
So, if we compare the sociological understanding of modern society as
self-produced and reflexive with the Hegelian universal subject or the
Marxist creation of history by man through gaining control over his
social conditions, we can indeed reveal some degree of congruence. I
suppose, that this is at least the real case of revolutionary practice:
n attempt to eliminate the reproduction of social activity and
functions (the condition of a history taken from zero-level or a blank
page) and substitute for it the production of society only. ut such
an ambition to master the social life comprises two main features:
organisation of knowledge and consequently of practice in the form of
text, and development of new techniques of creating power.
Discursive practice
It is rather naive to accept that the ideas of philosophy and social science, once they emerged and spread among intellectuals, directly affected society and induced its revolutionary change. Stating this would be extreme idealism. To escape this one needs to focus now on the sphere of signifiers \*- the domain of discursive practice and texts which are part of the latter. This logic is brought about by a simplistic, but important consideration.
It is now recognised that neither natural, nor material conditions of living are given to man in the form of direct and immediate relations. They are somewhat indirect and mediated by meanings attached to human environment, i.e. signified. The notion that social action is meaningful is quite common in sociology. Unfolding upon meaningful reality, social action is, therefore, bounded by the space and order of meanings as the latter provide the recognition of what reality ( or truth ) is.
Furthermore, the supposition that specific practices of organisation, change and demarcation in the order of meanings is crucial for the functioning of society, was made by Foucault. He defines them as discursive practices. They are characterised by "the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories. Thus, each discursive practice implies a play of prescriptions that designates its exclusions and choices" (Foucault 1977: 199). Alongside this Foucault shifts the definition of truth making it a property of some discursive practice (`regime of truth') or: "an ensemble of rules according to which the true and the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true" (Foucault 1980: 132). Hence, the discursive practice has a political dimension which consists of the codification of a whole number of power relations which render its functioning possible. That is why revolution for Foucault "is a different type of codification of the same relations" (ibid: 122).
This concept is helpful, although vulnerable to criticism. It corresponds to the sociological notion that the social actor posesses an amount of knowledge of his social environment, which he necessarily recognises as a true one (contrasted to a false one) and with the help of which his behaviour is constituted. The importance of discursive practice can be confirmed by the fact that revolution contains radical inventions in language, both written and oral. Earlier I argued that the very idea of revolution is historically new, and it has its roots in modern-time epistemology. This idea which presupposes a strong emphasis on social engineering and on gaining control over the reproduction of society could originally emerge only within a particular form of knowledge \*- science (first natural then social). Much has been written of economic, political and psychological conditions for revolutions. However, such phenomena as the discursive practices and signification regimes of revolutions, stayed outside the analysis, whereas the domain of meanings, i.e. the way social reality was codified, is important if one poses the question of why the revolutionary practices were reproduced in their basic structure. There is a need to look at the concrete ways of how knowledge, discursive practice and power are linked together to constitute these practices.
What is discursive practice in relation to modern-time revolutions? Basically it is (a) Marxist and (b) organised in the form of a text. This means that the way Marx interpreted capitalist society \*- demarcated by global oppositions (labour/capital, class of exploiters/class of exploited, pre-history/history, progressive class/reactionary class) must be reproduced so as to define its objects of action and to prescribe the strategy and tactics of such an action.
The Revolutionary Text is basically organised around two main dimensions. The first is the time axis: it polarises social history, codifying it as `past' and `future', which represent the pre-history and true history of humanity. `Past' is `exploitation', `future' is `justice'; `pre-history' is `slavery', `true history' is `freedom'. `Past' and `future' are dialectically related: (a) they negate each other (`past' must be negated and destroyed in the name and from the standpoint of `future'); (b) they presuppose each other (`future' can be freedom only if there was `past' of slavery, but `past' can be recognised as slavery only from the standpoint of `future'). The socially significant result of such dialectical demarcation of reality of the text is that within such a discourse `future' has the same status as `past'. They are now equal. In sociological terms `past' is expressed by `tradition', the latter being the source of legitimation of power which claims to represent tradition. The Revolutionary Text seems to provide `future' with the same status of `reality' and `truth' as life experience provided for tradition, transforming it into a real social force. But as the new `regime of truth' denied the validity of sensation (`Copernican effect') and placed truth beyond personal experience (see the first section concerning Fichte, Hegel, Marx), it needed a tabula rasa of history, i.e. no history or tradition. Thus the future, which by definition cannot be the matter of experience, but is actual through reason only (Hegelian "what is rational is actual"), can nevertheless become another source of the legitimation of power. his is how discursive practice can establish a new basis for power legitimated by the future only.
Glucksmann singles out a discursive formula which describes the mechanism of modern power: "`Do what you will' is the order given by Gargantua, that model leader, to his model subjects, on the treshold of that model of modernity which Rabelais imagined in the Abbey of Theleme [(...)] The formula is radical: it refers to the present (`Do') and governs the future (`what you will'). The past is struck off the map, definitively struck off, since repeating the formula means once again starting from scratch." (Glucksmann 1980:11-12).
The second dimension of the Revolutionary Text is the class axis. It codifies social space as that of class relations. Ultimately, society is divided into two confronting classes \*- dominating/exploiting and dominated/exploited. Thus war or any act of violence is of class origin, since history itself is the history of class struggle. The text sentences one of the classes to death \*- as an undisputable result of historical evolution, the other class (the oppressed one) is stated to be identical with history itself. Hence, the two classes are basically the `class of past' and the `class of future'. Defined as such, they correspond with the time axis.
This class grid is abstract enough to allow a flexible interpretataion of the text to embrace any historical situation. One needs to inscribe in its frame enough `meat' to induce certain effects of power. So texts of Marx are rewritten by Lenin in order to place backward Russia in the frontline of an incoming revolution. Stalin persistently quotes Lenin's texts to activate the discourse of violence for launching a new round of internment practice against a certain class sentenced by the text. And the text can provide a methodology for recognising, classifying and dealing with the enemy. All the crucial actions are grounded in the text where the world is divided by lines of force, and what matters is which volume and page to refer to for collectivisation, nationalisation, resourse allocation education or whatever else \*- both the question and the answer already exist. "Texts do not simply serve the exercise of power, they are that very exercise, they subject people" (Glucksmann 1980: 47). The politics of social engineering is, therefore, the politics of discourse.
But it is surprising that such a power/text technique seems to be functioning autonomously without its subjects or agencies. If the question of subject is posed it may create a problem of `vicious' subject/object opposition: whether a subject produces knowledge and text or whether certain knowledge constitutes its subject through text?
Structuralist and post-structuralist thought has put forward the idea of the irrelevance of the author in the interpretation of texts. Both Levi-Strauss and Barthes rejected the subjectivity of human consciousness, as they considered that a certain structure of signifiers constitutes the perspective of thinking of the world ("myths operate in men's minds without their being aware of it"). Such an approach is often referred to as `decentering of subject' within the structure of signifiers organised as the text. Thus, a certain text, once written exists quite autonomously \*- the decentering of subject then occurs due to the delimitation of its interpretations. Moreover, one can assume that the social impact of a certain text is based on its ability to constitute certain social subjects. The social, political, moral subject is constituted by and exists through certain discourse, or using the terms of Foucault, discursive apparatus produces a certain mode of subjectivity. Here we can assume that the revolutionary practices are essentially the practices of creation of a certain subjectivity. Historically the practice of creating subjectivity of a certain type through the Revolutionary Text was organised in the form of so-called `cultural revolution'. The latter is the common and functionally necessary element of revolutionary practice.
A mass state programme to liquidate illiteracy starts as soon as new power is installed. Everyone must be able to read \*- but to read, to be literate means definitely the ability to read a certain text. This is how the discourse of power occupies the whole field of writing - where the ABC of Communism, History of the Communist Party in the case of Russia) and its versions are used to teach literacy. Specifying the tasks of the state educational programme in 1925, the Minister of Education of the Soviet Government Lunacharsky stated, that "we need culture, starting from literacy and ending up with culture in the sphere of thought and culture in the sphere of senses." Education is constantly referred to as "the third front of revolution", that by means of which the first two (military defence and industry) could be maintained (Lunacharsky 1925: 21). This programme contains a radical idea, that education performs an important function by supplying a mass of specially trained people for allocation to the military fronts and industrial construction. The domination of a certain text in all global education programmes was a common practice in countries which had undergone a communist-type revolution \*- the practice of inscribing a new system of knowledge to substitute the traditional beliefs of the day-to-day practice of `the past'.
As it was supposed in the first part, revolution can be explained in terms of the development of a new system of knowledge, which, when attached to power, can be used for the restructuring of society. Such a power/knowledge effect, operating through discursive practice, is the core element of the social and political practice of revolution.
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