Social scientists are reluctant to grasp the fashionable labels and quickly changing cliches of the media-saturated world. They wait until the label is circulated for a considerable period of time so that they can recognise a serious social phenomenon to be studied, not a hype. Thus, postmodernism - neglected through the 60s and 70s - has come to the forefront in the 80s when it has become impossible to ignore it any longer.
The term `postmodernism', which appeared in the 60s as a characteristic of art and culture, has been integrated into mainstream social science through the work of some commentators on Habermas, who subsumed his French opponents in a debate on the fate of the Enlightenment (Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard) under the group name of `Postmoderns' (see also Bernstein (ed.) 1986 and Dews (ed.)1986).
The group was named after the title of the seminal work of Lyotard, who claimed that the breakdown of meta-narratives of progress which gave a coherent set of coordinates to ground different spheres of human activity led to the disintegration of this coherent whole into a pluralism of language games which can no longer be included in one general account. Derrida's work on the deconstruction of binary oppositions pervading western philosophy and Foucault's genealogies of different human practices (which seem to have eschewed these oppositions) proposed new standards for philosophy and history (Lyotard 1982. See also Norris 1987. Dreyfus 1982). Since then `postmodern thought' has sent ripples through all terrains of social inquiry.
Cultural studies and political science were fast to jump onto the postmodern bandwagon. Jameson's classic essay provided an interpretation of postmodernism as the dominant cultural logic of the third stage of capitalism together with an account of the characteristics of postmodernism: the depthlessness of the art product, the prevalence of the figural over the discursive, the waning of affect, the abolition of the critical distance of an artist/theorist. This powerful intervention set the framework for a debate in cultural studies which still rages (Jameson 1988. See also Kaplan (ed.) 1988).
Political science was also receptive to postmodern themes. Because of its long-standing interest in the end of `possessive individualism' it was eager to absorb the `de-centering of the subject' into its speculations (Dallmayr 1981); concern with language and culture as sites of political struggle made it easy to explore the themes of artistic postmodernism in relation to politics (Arac (ed.) 1986); and new social movements produced the tangible ground for anticipated postmodern changes in polity (Maier (ed.)1986). The radical postmodern critique of philosophical categories was transformed into the radical critique of political institutions that embodied these categories (Ryan 1983). Of course, there were some hollow works just incorporating a fashionable term into their titles (Barrileaux 1988); but there also were serious overviews of a `postmodern political condition' (Heller 1988) as living `post-histoire', in the shambles of grand liberatory narratives and of the great `project of Europe' which provided a model for political modernisation for the rest of the world.
Sociology was the last to catch up. The two pieces of the jigsaw puzzle called `postmodernism' and `sociology' could not be made fit for a long time; but once a link was established, an avalanche of literature was produced at the turn of the 90s. As usual the last convert to a new faith was most eager to prove that it is the most fervent adherent: `postmodernity' and `postmodernisation' were invented to accommodate postmodernism into sociological discourse (with their counterparts in the past as `modernity' and `modernisation').1 `Modernity' was most suitable for sociologists because it looked comfortably like `industrial society', although viewing this familiar society from a new vantage point of `postmodernity' gave the possibility of finding some previously unnoticed details - and the possibility of publishing another book with the word `modernity' in its title.
In this article I shall not trespass on the territories of various modernities and postmodernities but only examine the original juxtaposition of `postmodernism' and `sociology', which initiated the avalanche. Thus I shall primarily take into account those works which explicitly posed the question of how sociology should deal with postmodernism - whether to provide a sociology of postmodernism or a postmodern sociology, i.e. analyse postmodernism sociologically or introduce postmodern theorising into sociology.
Turner states in a rough generalisation that "a sociology of postmodernism tends to locate postmodern culture in a context of disorganized capitalism, of consumer society and cultural mass production" (1990). This seems right, but to discriminate finer details it is more useful to employ the notion of three aspects of a sociology of postmodernism as proposed by Featherstone (1988a: 205-7). Firstly, the analysis of changing activities of artists and intellectuals in postmodern culture. However, one should not forget that the alleged `postmodern' activities of artists and academics may be the result of a familiar strategy of naming, whereby a new label is used as a weapon in a power game in established fields of scientific and artistic discourse for setting up a new field, thus clearing the way for the institutionalisation of newcomers as an avant-garde.
The second direction of a sociology of postmodernism comprises the analysis of changing relations between artists and intellectuals and the rest of society. How has the transmission and circulation of cultural goods changed? Featherstone proposes to study it in the terms of group interrelationships. The rise of the so-called `New cultural intermediaries' is central here. Also not only the intra-societal level but the inter-societal one should be taken into account: how does the world economy of cultural production change?
But the most prominent sphere of analysis, which is supposed to provide solid foundation for sociology of postmodernism is the "changes in everyday life of some groups, who may be using regimes of signification in different ways and developing new means of orientation and identity structures" (ibid: 208).
The emphasis on everyday life experience preoccupied the sociology of postmodernism from the very beginning. Bearing in mind that it can itself be accused of a strategy of naming (just relabelling the old insignificant experiences as new `postmodern' ones) the sociology of postmodernism needs sound evidence, "information in terms of stock sociological questions `who? when? where? how many?' if" it is "to impress colleagues that postmodernism is more than a fad" (ibid: 207).
Lash is aware of the same danger - and after producing a refined conception of postmodernism as a new regime of signification he is compelled to admit that "such an explanation is again strictly internal to the realm of culture and badly in need of sociological grounding " (1990: 15). He proposes four "properly sociological explanations" that "go some way in accounting for the phenomena of modernism and postmodernism": firstly, postmodernism re-stabilises bourgeois identity; secondly, postmodern culture is a catalyst of working class fragmentation; thirdly, there are observed changes in the material and cultural structure of the built environment; fourthly, it comprises a consideration of the political economy of postmodern culture.
The first two explanations were quickly incorporated into the sociology of postmodernism as `sound foundations': the earlier programmatic Featherstone article focuses exclusively on the first and second aspects of a sociology of postmodernism - i.e. on changes in intellectual activity and its dissemination through `new cultural intermediaries' (Featherstone 1988b:147-70), - while the latter is primarily haunted by the third - the ghost of everyday experiences.
Actually, the first two explanations constitute one narrative. Following Lash, realist culture - `realist' in the aesthetic and epistemological senses - is associated with a nascent bourgeoisie in two ways: firstly, an audience receptive to realism was provided; secondly, realist cultural forms reinforced a set of beliefs fundamental to bourgeois identity. Starting from the end of the 19th century two forces challenged bourgeois identity - the adoption of realism by the working class (but with aims opposing those of the bourgeoisie) and modernism as an aesthetic movement (` \*'epater le bourgeois .
Thus, postmodernism is viewed as a godsend to salvage the bourgeoisie because it pacifies both its critics:
- it replaces realism and by means of that, de-centres working class identity
- it removes modernism as an ideology of the critical elite.
The departure of working class identity from realism started at the end of the 1950s. Following Martin (1981) Lash cites the rise of rock music, the augmentation of teenage spending power and the birth of adolescence as major sources of working class identity fragmentation. Pop culture is said to have produced effects both on the level of individual identity (rejection of parental control and the lessening of restrictions on sexuality) and on the level of collective identity (lessening of identification with the Labour party and trade unions; decentralised workers' action etc.).
The description sounds plausible, but what has this to do with postmodernism? Pop culture, claims Lash, shared "key characteristics with the latter" (1990: 26): its foregrounding of the spectacle, similar to postmodernism, threw down the gauntlet to realist narrative; it was bound to image and sound rather than language; it shifts from representations to symbols.
A counter-argument can be constructed on `Kumarian' lines. Kumar has suggested that all the `self-evident' changes advocated by postindustrial theories in the 70s are in a direct continuity with (and in effect, represent the implementation of) industrialisation as described by the classics of modern social thought (1978). Therefore the whole postindustrial affair can be treated as a huge enterprise in relabelling.
One can similarly suggest that the `postmodern' fragmentation of working class identity is a rather modern phenomenon - a result of the `differentiating' thrust of the modernising project as described by Weber. It may be proposed that factions within the working class are being differentiated following the logic of rationalisation. Przeworski has shown how membership in a class can be treated as a matter of rational choice (1985). The same can be applied to the membership in a faction within a class: a worker can support or not support Labour in current elections, follow or not follow his trade union decision concerning a strike - it depends on a rational calculation of the gains/losses of potential behaviour. As Offe has noticed: "Indeed, there are good reasons why it may be rational for individual actors in a class society not to act in reference to classes or in accordance with their class interests" (1985: 2).
Thus rationalisation leads to the internal breakdown of the collective identities of actors in earlier stages of modernisation as a result of an effort to gain maximum advantage by rational choice. The fragmentation of working class identity seems to be rather weakly tied with `postmodern experiences'. The changes of everyday life which are supposed to give tangibility to the sociology of postmodernism argument are obvious (rock culture, decentralised workers' action etc.) but why qualify them as postmodern?
Following Jameson's conception of the abolition of a critical distance, Lash states that modernism as an ideology of the critical elite is dead in the era of effaced high/low culture contradictions and there is no serious enemy to challenge bourgeois identity. However, it turns out that that identity has itself changed.
Identity, for Lash who follows Bourdieu, is a set of two components: (1) belonging to the same group and (2) common classification of external phenomena. The second component is significant because different classes and class factions have different systems of classification. This explains the difference between the older `new middle classes' which are unfavourable to postmodern phenomena and the newer `postindustrial middle classes' that provide an audience for postmodern culture. Bourgeois identity is re-stabilised around this newer middle class. "Postmodern culture... can be seen in terms of a set of symbols and legitimations which promote the ideal interests of... new, `Yuppified' postindustrial bourgeoisie" (Lash 1990: 20-21). Battles for hegemony are waged in the form of `classificatory struggles' and according to Lash the yuppified middle class seems to impose its postmodern views as hegemonic for the bourgeoisie and consequently for the whole society.
Given the significance of these `newer middle classes' we should pay closer attention to them. The newer, postindustrial middle classes are based in media, higher education, finance, advertising, merchandising, international exchange etc. They are upwardly mobile but they are part of the mass, because they did not come from the families of established groupings, and, hence, turned the elite into a massified layer. Hence the populism and image-centredness of these newer middle classes, who are rejecting old elite patterns.
The picture Lash provides is strikingly similar to the one Featherstone describes in his second aspect of a sociology of postmodernism. The sector which plays the most prominent part in the newer middle class providing for the massification of elite is called `New cultural intermediaries' (Bourdieu). Although yuppies themselves count for no more than 14% of the baby-boom generation, nearly 50% of the baby-boom cohort can be counted as `psychographic yuppies' who exhibit similar attitudes (Featherstone 1988b:162).
These new cultural intermediaries, being engaged in providing symbolic goods and services, introduced the values of intellectuals' lives into mass consciousness. They also promoted a new breed of celebrity intellectuals who have little distaste for pop culture. "This [(...)] thus helps to create an audience within the new middle class and potentially beyond, for new symbolic goods and experiences, for the intellectual and artistic way of life which could be receptive to some of the sensibilities that are incorporated into and disseminated in postmodernism" (ibid: 163).
To sum up: the re-stabilisation of bourgeois identity comes through the emergence of a newer yuppified middle class, which is characterised by the reception of postmodern classifications and is constituted around the activity of new cultural intermediaries propagating postmodern values.
Post-Marxist political theorists may be said to provide somewhat similar descriptions of the social. According to them, polity is a dispersed cloud of subject positions which can be united by hegemonic articulations to constitute hegemonic blocs (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Then new cultural intermediaries can be treated as a `nodal point' which constitutes the hegemonic bloc of the `newer middle classes' via its activity.
Indeed, if we know that intra-group identities are constituted through discursive classifications, then we can follow Geras's argument against post-Marxists and apply it to Lash: "We know... that there is a plurality and variety of subject positions, all discursively constituted, that some of them can become hegemonic practices... and succeed, some of them, in establishing hegemonic nodal points". But why? "Would it be due only or mainly to the inherent `attractiveness' of discourses in play and, if so, what might be the criteria of that, given that any adjudication between discourses is itself another discourse..? ...would it have anything to do with material or other resources in different subject positions? Or with different political capacities (and what would be the reasons for these)?" (Geras 1988: 108-9).
Really, why did the propagation of postmodern values by new cultural intermediaries provide for the creation of a new massified elite? And why was another nodal point (which propagated, say, anti-postmodern or neo-realist views) unable to gain hegemony? Until the privileged position of the new cultural intermediaries and their adherence to postmodern world-views are explained the whole of Lash's exposition reminds one of a hanging garden without a ground floor.
Thus both everyday experiences which were supposed to provide a sound basis for the sociology of postmodernism are rather questionable. Firstly, it is not clear enough why some basic modern experiences should be requalified as postmodern. Secondly, the new postmodern experiences, identities and classes are constructed as a result of a totally `charismatic' (in that it is not rationally grounded) activity of a social group whose adherence to postmodernism is not rationally explained either.
Featherstone criticises Jameson for the description of the Bonaventure Hotel as being postmodern on the grounds that common people would never realise that it was postmodern judging by their own standards if they were not told about it by Jameson. But it seems equally valid to suggest that a sociologist would never realise that the sociology Featherstone and Lash propound, is the sociology of postmodernism, were they not told by them in advance.
Bauman concentrates on the first and second aspects of Featherstone's scheme: what does actually change in the situation of intellectuals; what can account for their preoccupation with postmodern activities? Following Offe's `de-centering' of the notion of work as a focus providing individual motivation, social integration and systemic reproduction, Bauman proposes that "in the present day society, consumer conduct (consumer freedom geared to consumer market) moves steadily into position of, simultaneously, the cognitive and the moral focus of life, integrative bond of the society, and the focus of systemic management". This is a characteristic of postmodernity as "a fully-fledged, comprehensive and viable type of social system" (Bauman 1988a: 807).
During the `modern' era intellectuals were needed by the ruling elite to provide grand schemes and narratives to legitimate power. The contemporary situation is characterised, according to Bauman, by `legitimation crisis', not in the familiar Habermasian sense but in the sense of a declining need to legitimate power. Legitimation as an instrument of power has been replaced by seduction/repression, where consumer seduction plays the upper hand.
The prevalence of consumer seduction stems from the fact that the production of needs by the market finally led to the creation of the need in the market itself: "market dependency is achieved through the destruction of such skills (technical, social and existential) which do not entail the use of marketable commodities..." (ibid: 808). The pleasure principle which threatened the world of production is defused via the new focus of society - consumption. The producer moved by the pleasure principle is a disaster, but the consumer not moved by it is even more disastrous.
Thus, individuals are integrated into consumer society via seduction. Those who fail to be integrated via consumer behaviour, - e.g. the structurally unemployed and/or underclass - are repressed through the panoptical mechanisms described by Foucault. This means that the state is no longer interested in stories of legitimation and hence, withdraws from the cultural sphere. Intellectuals lose their status of `legislators' because there is no more need to justify state activity as true and moral. The market quickly fills the vacuum created by the state's withdrawal and with this is what `hurts most': cultural production is carried out by the entrepreneurs of mass culture and the sphere which intellectuals traditionally considered to be their private property is expropriated from them.
The third factor adding to a current degrading of intellectuals is a breakdown of western-type models of development which former `legislators' supplied to modernising nations. Pluralism of cultures is the sign of the times and no `universal standpoint' is able to claim privileged status now. What is left to intellectuals in these changed conditions is to adjudicate between discourses, to interpret cultural goods produced by the others, to translate the terms of one culture into another...
Summing up one can divide this sociological account of the postmodern condition into two parts: a sociology of postmodernity as a `viable social system' and a sociology of intellectuals which explains their postmodern experience. Bauman's attempt to propose a sociology of postmodernism is more elegant and persuasive than the exhausted play with fractions of classes produced by Featherstone and Lash. The advantages of Bauman's theorising are immediately visible: instead of an increase in the status and standing of intellectual work as expected by the proponents of postindustrialism Bauman has captured and explained the current prevailing "anxiety, out-of-placeness, and loss of direction" mood among the intellectuals (Smart 1990: 412). Also the concept of "postmodernity as a viable social system" attempts to theorise the still dimly perceptible but numerous shifts in social life which as a whole constitute an epochal break with the past.
This being true, let us, nevertheless, consider the methodological premises of both of Bauman's accounts. Lyotard, who initiated the debate on postmodern condition as a decline of meta-narratives, is conventionally criticised for having supplied a meta-narrative himself. The same counter-argument can be applied to the sociology of postmodern condition of intellectuals of Bauman: is Bauman himself a legislator or an interpreter? Does he propose a totalising linear scheme of a change in the status of the intellectual (which is universally applicable); or does he just interpret postmodern intellectuals' practices in terms of modern intellectuals?
The former position being held, one is likely to treat Bauman's approach as yet another inconsistent attempt to provide a universal theory in a `pluralistic' disguise because Bauman by his own activity disproves the proposed explanation. If on the other hand, he is just providing another interpretation among the million possible then what validity should one attribute to it? In this case Bauman's narrative cannot be treated as a piece of sociology of postmodernism - even with its limited claims to validity - because it does not provide an objective picture of the reality sociology is meant to supply but yields one of subjective interpretations only. Both stances being self-undermining, it looks plausible to consider the narrative of `legislators and interpreters' as suicidal.
Later, Bauman's sociology of postmodernism gives an account of consumer society regulated via seduction/repression. Here sociology of postmodernism adopts the standard `Ideologiekritik' stance - `making the opaque transparent'. Instead of being at the service of the repressive state or the seductive market, the sociology of postmodernism should provide a means of waking up of the seduced and raising up the repressed. "The critique under consideration may be launched... only from the intention to preserve the hopes and ambitions of modernity in the age of postmodernity" (Bauman 1988b: 231). This sociology of postmodernism corresponds with the third one of the triad of Habermasian cognitive interests (technical, interpretative, emancipative), as Smart has aptly noticed (1990: 26).
One may add that this equivalence somehow explains the `auratic`, `outsider' status of sociology of postmodernism in consumer society (similar to the status of `critical theory' in `late capitalism'): it is "likely to annoy rather than entice the managers of law and order; it will appear incomprehensible to the seduced and alluring yet nebulous to the repressed" (Bauman 1988b: 236).
The strong affinity with the Marcusean variant of the critical theory, which relied on the critical detachment of the theorist and the activities of dropouts and outcasts, is obvious. This affinity is reinforced by the use and development of the Marcusean concept of the production of needs. It is easy to notice that the mechanism of consumer seduction does not differ radically from the one described by Marcuse who wrote: "With technical progress as its instrument, unfreedom - in the sense of man's subjection to his productive apparatus - is perpetuated and intensified in the form of many liberties and comforts" (1964: 33). Substitute consumption for production (one general need in the market for production of needs via the market) and you get Bauman's seduction out of the Marcusean `dictatorship over needs'.
Thus Bauman should answer the question posed to Marcusean theory almost 20 years ago: who is supposed to fulfil the tasks of liberation proposed by the theory? How can a critical stance be possible in the totally administered (seduced/ repressed) society? How practical is reliance on outcasts/ dropouts/ critical theorists? Bauman states that "such a critique would have to admit its allegiance to ends the insiders are not obliged to share. It would have to cite an understanding of the role of sociology the insiders have every reason to reject, and no reason to embrace" (1988b: 231). The sociology of postmodernism in Bauman's words is geared to "a reason-led improvement in human condition" and following this dictum one has every reason to reject, and no reason to embrace this `postmodern Marcuseanism' - precisely in order to improve the human condition, all the more so, when one takes seriously Bauman's latest book on the intimate ties between modernity and the Holocaust (1989).
It seems plausible to describe the sociology of postmodernism as a dubious attempt to accommodate postmodernism into sociology as an object of research conducted with proper sociological tools. All the attempts presented above strive to provide a sociological description of postmodernity, at the same time rejecting or criticising attempts to incorporate postmodernism into the sacred core of sociology - i.e. into its methodological apparatus - and thus create postmodern sociology.
Postmodern sociology seems for a majority of sociologists to be either nonsense or an affair which is not worthwhile. For example, Featherstone decries the possibility of postmodern sociology because when applied to postmodernism it would be "a parasite on a parasite - which would use postmodern strategies to play on the unities and differences within postmodernism, its paradoxes, ironies, incoherencies, intertextuality and multiphrenic qualities..." (1988: 151). A dismissal of the reflexive application of postmodern sociology on the ground that it is reflexive gives no credit to Featherstone. The limited value of the reflexive application is not proved at all; one cannot so easily dismiss the productive possibilities of postmodern sociology. Applying postmodern strategies to analyse social reality and sociological categories can bring fruitful results. For example, `playing on the unities and differences' between the texts of a radio-commentator and Durkheim's classic on suicide it can be shown that they have similar rhetorical structures which are employed with similar aims - not to solve the problem but to provide an acceptable theoretical scheme (Brown 1983).
A strong doubt about the value and relevance of postmodern sociology also served Bauman as a reason for questioning it. Though his description of postmodern sociology is different from Featherstone, Bauman initially considered postmodern sociology as an enterprise reminiscent in the final account of "l'art pour art", and, hence, irrelevant to societal needs. Bauman has baptised with the name of `postmodern sociology' all those types of sociological discourse which appeared in the 60s challenging the structural-functionalist `orthodox consensus' (Giddens 1987) of the postwar period. To cite him: "postmodern sociology received its original boost from Garfinkel's techniques conceived to expose the endemic fragility and brittleness of social reality, its `merely' conversational and conventional groundings, its negotiability, perpetual use and irreparable under-determination" (Bauman 1988a: 804). Subsequently works by Schutz, Gadamer and Wittgenstein have been adopted by postmodern sociology to assert the self-propelling capacity of social action, the debunking of `because of' explanations as hidden `in order to' motives, the dissolution of systemic order into a plethora of multiple localities of language games and/or meaning-generating procedures.
This definition of `PMS' led however to two differing conclusions over the last three years. Following the article published in 1988, the postmodern sociologist is left with nothing but to perfect the skill of interpretation, translating the meanings of alien cultures into one's own with as little damage as possible. But as these translatory-interpretative techniques have nothing to do with power in the age of de-legitimation, postmodern sociology is at risk of turning into art for art's sake: "...to immerse oneself fully into one's own specialised discourse inside which one feels comfortably at home, to savour the subtleties of distinction and discretion such discourse demands and renders possible, to take the very disinterestedness of one's pursuits for the sign of their supreme value, to take pride in keeping alive, against all odds, a precious endeavour for which the rest, the polluted and corrupted part of the world has... no use" (Bauman 1988b: 230).
This is a powerful rhetoric. But, conversely, it seems to apply first of all to what Bauman constructed as an alternative to postmodern sociology - his sociology of postmodernism, for its reliance on the Marcusean stance of the critical theorist leads to the production of concepts with `no use' to the seduced/ repressed of the world. Maybe this is why in the 1990 article, vices are turned into virtues and postmodern sociology is said to be the activity which, although inside a particular discourse, seeks to utilise the chances this "insidedness" contains. "It sets out thereafter to clarify the conditions under which knowledge (all knowledge, including itself) is formed and socially sustained, all along remaining conscious of its own work as an activity that adds to, rather than replacing and displacing the interpretations woven into reality it wishes to interpret" (Bauman 1990: 430).
Bauman's rendition of the position of postmodern sociology in society also drastically changed, following this Garaudy-like ` grand tournant of theory: from a sociology unable to deal with the postmodern condition (but just representing it mimetically, through its pluralism of discourses) it has been reconsidered as the only one capable of grasping the postmodern condition of knowledge. "....Inquiring into the basis of knowledge in general, good knowledge included, turned out to be first and foremost a sociological enterprise once it has been accepted that the `goodness' of knowledge is socially (communally) determined and cannot be otherwise arrived at. The traditional consensus of philosophy has been submerged by sociological reason" (ibid: 441).
Still, a `return of the repressed' can have only been made through an obliteration of one's own previous statements. Indeed, can even this `interpretative sociology' be socially relevant in the age of de-legitimation? The question is inescapable (and unanswerable) as long as one accepts Bauman's line of presenting postmodern sociology, whether in a positive or negative light, as an interpretative one. But it may be possible to show that Bauman's rendition of postmodern sociology is inaccurate and the thing called post modern sociology is rather different from his description.
Some conjectures may be valuable as to why Bauman nominates Garfinkel and Schutz as the principal figures of postmodern sociology? Bauman has considered art as a paradigm of postmodernity and, thus, had to find the structural affinity between postmodern art, postmodern culture, postmodern world-views and postmodern sociology. The first three appeared in the 60s - alas, the 60s also had to be the years for postmodern sociology to appear. Phenomenological sociology was a natural saving grace for a conception of postmodern sociology as `mimetically representing' postmodernity. His next task was to establish postmodern sociology as an already long-known enemy who failed to substitute a new consensus for an orthodox one. This brand of postmodern sociology was easily knocked down by the agile criticism and propositions for the favoured sociology of postmodernism.
It is impossible to rely heavily on labels in defining differences between the scientific discourses but it may be useful to point out that the initial equation of postmodern sociology with the sociology of Garfinkel and Schutz did injustice towards current debates on postmodernism which primarily deal with `post-structuralist' thought. This injustice has been turned into a `symbolic violence' when Bauman has also equated `postmodern' with `interpretative' and `interpretative' with `hermeneutical'. Not to leave the poststructuralists out of the picture, he has turned them into `interpreters' putting Derrida and Barthes in a direct continuity with the likes of Schleiermacher, Dilthy and Gadamer.
All these theoretical traditions - the phomenological sociology of Garfinkel and Schutz, the hermeneutics of Gadamer and the post-structuralism of Derrida and Barthes - are not only different but, in certain aspects, contradictory. For example, structuralism in France has been constituted primarily as an anti-phenomenological critique; and despite post-structuralism removing many assumptions of structuralism it still makes sense to assure the continuity between them (because of the use of the same basic concepts - e.g. critique of the notion of the constituting subject) and thus assert the anti-phenomenological bias of post-structuralism (Dews 1987: xiv).
If Dews states the difference between phenomenology and post-structuralism in philosophical discourse, Giddens finds this difference in social theory. He approaches from a different angle, employing Garfinkel to undermine post-structuralism with its critical development of the Saussurean conception of meaning. Garfinkel's notions of `methodological devices' and meanings as grounded in everyday `talk' are used to criticise the context-free system of differences of `langue' and to "correct the lapses of structuralism and post-structuralism" (Giddens 1987: 100).
What is interesting for us here is not the critique itself, but the stated difference of discourses. This difference also explains why Giddens's critique cannot reach its aim. Firstly, one may find examples of post-structuralist critiques of the phenomenological approach which are no less powerful than their `Giddensian counterpart' (see also Derrida 1978). Secondly, because of this difference of discourses Giddens is stuck in what Lyotard calls `the differend': "... a case of conflict between... two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments... Applying a single rule of judgment to both in order to settle their differend as though it was merely a litigation would wrong (at least) one of them (and both of them if neither side admits the rule)" Lyotard 1988: xi).
Interpreting `the errors' of one discourse in terms of another is easy - and Giddens provides an example of this. But to reiterate the point: what is relevant to us is the difference and the differend between phenomenological and post-structuralist discourses.
The same difference can be stated between hermeneutics and poststructuralism. Jameson cites `depthlessness' as a distinct characteristic of postmodern artefacts, which prevents the interpretation of them - that means finding some hidden reality beneath their surface, be it some psycho-biographical details of the author or a reflection of some social reality (Jameson 1984: 60). Also one can note that the late Roland Barthes's notions of the `rustle of language' or `the pleasures of the text' are the events on the surface of signifiers and not of some `deeper' reality of understanding and interpretation. Similarly, Derrida's dictum that `there is nothing outside of the text' is a denial of a possibility of interpretation in an aforementioned sense: what is left is just an interplay of the texts.
Thus Bauman's attempt to describe postmodern sociology as a purely `interpretative' enterprise does little justice to the `post-structuralist' strain in postmodern sociology. Murphy's account of postmodern sociology as primarily a post-structuralist sociology (1988: 600-15) looks rather more plausible in the light of the current debate on postmodernism and substantive differences between both discourses.
According to Murphy, postmodernism eschews the binary oppositions inherent in modern thought and, thus, gives clues towards the re-thinking of traditional assumptions in different theoretical domains.
Postmodernists undermine the traditional Cartesian dualism that is ubiquitous to mainstream sociology. In sociology, which relies on a separation between subjective opinions and objective facts, the subject/object opposition provides grounds for establishing `true objective knowledge'. But if subject/object opposition is suspended and a Cartesian mind/body dichotomy crumbles then Murphy can employ Merleau-Ponty's notions of knowledge, which have a fleshy texture, and of language as a connective tissue of reality. This means that language is not treated as the means to represent `real' events but is given the status of an event itself. Language and reality are inseparable; and "...social life derives its meaning from speech acts. Rather than a conduit, language is a creative force" (Murphy 1988: 603).
As interpretation is inseparable from perception then truth is not to be found in the correspondence between things and concepts, but "encountered only indirectly or in terms of the `undecidables' that are indigenous to interpretation. An Archimedian point is thus unavailable to ground knowledge..." Truth is the product of language games in that "language use... institutes a set of rules that differentiate reality from illusion. Rather than objective, knowledge is outlined in terms of assumptions that are linguistically prescribed" (ibid: 604). Stable institutions embody a version of linguistic practice that is not regularly questioned. "Reality, simply stated, is a language game that is accepted, at least temporarily, as valid" (ibid: 612).
Following de Man, Murphy argues that the theorists always sought the One, the Good and the True in order to find a stable basis for the constitution of society. This stable basis in the form of an abstract principle was needed to structure society in order to escape the Hobbesian war of `all against all'. Order can not be preserved through differing interpretations but through one stable anchor - the objective structural principle. This is achieved at a high price - personal hopes and aspirations are held subordinate to this structural principle. But if we adopt another assumption - namely, that order and freedom are not opposite sides of a contradiction - then we can see that spontaneousness does not necessarily bring chaos.
Hence we can imagine a less oppressive society, where norms are more receptive to opinions and individuals are not subordinate to impersonal structures. Instead of a system guided by universal laws and based on a structural centre, this society is a `systase' (a term proposed by Gebser (1985)) where persons are related without an intermediary. They are able to approach one another freely through the recognition of difference; while order is preserved through a `patchwork of language pragmatics that vibrate at all times' (Lyotard).
Murphy thinks that, having adopted postmodern assumptions, not only can a better society be imagined but also sociological research can be `invigorated'. Firstly, if the subject/object opposition is eschewed and interpretation is inseparable from perception then there is no need to strive for objectivity in science - the goal is at least unattainable and if still pursued, misleading. "Exposed by postmodernism ... is the sobering thought that value freedom may pervert data, rather than assure sociologists access to truth" (Murphy 1988: 613).
The experimental and definitional core of the data can easily be distorted, even by a researcher who truly loathes such bias, because `value free' science is based on unquestioned or insufficiently scrutinised values. `Facts' without interpretation are impossible, even in natural sciences (the standard of objectivity) a discovery of data is affected by measurement process. "Postmodernists recommend that social scientists strive to understand the value base of data, rather than searching for ways to purge values from research". Secondly, " postmodernists resurrect the question `Is it true?' and re-introduce it into research ". Data collection is altered significantly as a result of this: "instead of focusing on logistical issues, researchers will strive to devise ways to capture the social meaning of facts ... Technical competence is insufficient to gain this insight. Instead `communicative competence' should be cultivated among researchers" (ibid: 606-7).
As perception and interpretation are not differentiated one can grasp social meanings which others ascribe to the same phenomena without empathy, which was a cornerstone for phenomenological `taking the role of the other'. Effective communication is possible between individuals who share nothing in common, and sociologists must hold their values in abeyance because their rendition of `reality' is not granted universality.
It is not easy to escape the growing feeling of unsatisfied expectations while reading Murphy's article. The proposed introduction of post-structuralism into sociology has been gradually displaced by the assertion of a Wittgensteinian `language games' approach where citations from post-structuralists serve more as an embellishment. The task of eschewing oppositions is proclaimed but not fulfilled; the results are rather meagre as they remind us of the ones already produced by phenomenological sociology. Only at first sight does Murphy`s variant of postmodern sociology seem to be consistent with postmodern aspirations and relevant to society in that it may bring a better life. Closer scrutiny raises doubts.
One can easily spot a `performative paradox', as Turner ascribes it to postmodern sociology (1990: 6): in proposing new ways of doing sociology Murphy keeps on employing the concepts and methods he has decided to get rid of. Firstly, the notion of a desired `less oppressive society' as a direction of change is a part of a teleological meta-narrative, which postmodern sociology seeks to reject. Secondly, the same applies to oppositions - they pervade the text implicitly (being eliminated explicitly): old/new sociology; system/systose language as means of representing events/language as constituting the events etc.
It turnes out that Murphy proposes an explanation of the relevance of postmodern sociology which yields more questions than solutions. Thus, being consistent, one cannot assure the relevance of postmodern sociology through a traditional discourse of privileged scientific and/or liberatory standpoints in a society. This effectively brings us back to the pluralist discourse, and consequently to the pluralist predicament stated by Bauman: pluralism in the age of de-legitimation means irrelevance.
Still we can find the way out of this predicament following Murphy's useful notion of postmodern sociology as the one which eschews oppositions. D'Amico argued that postmodern relativists do not relativise every statement but only assumptions of knowledge (1986: 135-45). Hence, a critique of postmodernism cannot usually reach its aim because counter-arguments are formulated on the assumptions which are already questioned by postmodernism.
A similar argument can disarm Bauman's critique. His implication that the relativism of postmodern sociology is tied with its practical irrelevance is predicated on a theory/practice opposition which postmodernism tries to eschew. Bauman's position cannot be held viable any more if it is articulated on the presuppositions undermined by postmodernism. Then the unchallenged relevance of postmodernism can be seen in methodological intervention into sociological discourse: current dichotomies guiding sociological research can be questioned and alternatives escaping these dichotomies may be proposed. For example, postmodern ways of dealing with oppositions and/or contradictions pursued through the spheres of controversies in sociology (where debates may go on fruitlessly forever) may produce promising perspectives.
To escape the `performative paradox' postmodern sociology may follow Foucault's rhetorics as de Certeau has ingeniously shown (1982: 257-65). Foucault's book on panopticism in institutions and human sciences can possibly be criticised for panopticism itself. He puts some historical practices under close scrutiny, cutting them out of discursive fields and bringing them in front of himself - to produce `theoria' (`I see it here' in ancient Greek). Foucault uses three main tools to prove the centrality of panopticism: citation of other texts, analytical tables (eg. `six rules of punitive semio-technique'), figural images from the past (pictures, engravings, photos). These tools provide for the self-evidence of the exposition and `scientific' outlook of the text. If one, somehow, cares to delve deeper into the intricacies of reasoning and the selection of citations, examples and images, one can easily find that Foucault's manouevres fall outside of the standard scientific enquiry. Data is so obviously manipulated to suit Foucault's aims that any experienced scientist may find a thousand objections. The `scientific discourse' of Foucault disguises a playful Nietzschean rhetoric; after the effect of persuading the public (which is more receptive to scientific rather than Nietzschean discourse) is achieved, counter-arguments of enraged scientists do not get any attention at all. Thus being postmodern in content, Foucault's narrative is postmodern in form also, and by this escapes the performative paradox.
It is perfectly lawful to ask: why should one strive for postmodern sociologies? Who needs these alternatives? The proposed answer lies in an obsession of postmodern times. Affinities between modern rationalism in philosophy and social sciences on the one hand and the Gulag archipelago and the Holocaust on the other are only stated; their cause/effect relationship is not proved (and being postmodern one is likely to evade cause/effect statements). But even the mere fact of these affinities makes the search for alternative modes of thinking and/or sociologising justified.
Having gone so far in the analysis one should stop and look back. This glance may produce surprise: what has been achieved is a meticulous elaboration of the contradiction `sociology of postmodernism/postmodern sociology'.
Sociology of postmodernism rests on the appropriation of postmodernism with the help of the usual sociological tools - and on explication of new phenomena with the help of an old conceptual apparatus. Conversely, postmodern sociology is an introduction of new tools themselves, new methods to analyse social phenomena. This contradiction stated in its most primitive form boils down to an `old methods applied to new phenomena/new methods applied to old phenomena' opposition; or `change in subject matter/change in method' as diverse ways for the development of sociology.
The second part of this work was an attempt to overturn opposition as a first phase of the `general strategy of deconstruction' proposed by Derrida. Change in subject matter (i.e. in sociology of postmodernism) clearly gains the upper hand over change in method right now, so "to deconstruct the opposition, first of all is to overturn the hierarchy at a given moment" (Derrida 1981: 41). Thus, changing methods (as proposed by postmodern sociology) has been shown to be no more internally suicidal and no less consistent logically and practically than its rival, which dominates the hierarchy now. It has unlawfully usurped the upper position because of the conventional conceptual conservatism of sociologists (even though this conservatism can present itself in the guise of a radical critical position).
This conceptual conservatism can be rather adequately explained by reference to the power structure of academia. To add a new field to an already existing discipline is a safe way of getting additional funds and chairs in universities. Contrary to this, changing methods implies a reconsideration of the discipline itself, a blurring of its clear borders with the neighbouring ones. The instability which a change in method provokes does not necessarily imply expansion rather than contraction, and thus is no guaranteed safe means of preserving funds and status for those who call themselves sociologists.
But overturning is just one phase of deconstruction. "That being said - and on the other hand - to remain in this phase is still to operate on the terrain of and from within the deconstructed system... We must also mark the interval between inversion, which brings low what was high, and the irruptive emergence of a new `concept`, a concept that can no longer be, and never could be, included in the previous regime" (Derrida 1981: 42). In the second phase one sets to work within the text an `undecidable', that is to say a unity of verbal properties that can no longer be included within an opposition, which, however, inhabit it, resisting and disorganising it without ever constituting a third term.
It looks as though postmodernism is a term which constitutes this undecidable for sociology. Postmodernism is neither change in subject (as the critique of the works of Lash and Featherstone has shown) nor change in method (as the critique of Murphy has demonstrated). It is at the same time a change in subject (there is something called postmodernism which sociology should explain) and/or a change in method (as this exposition proves by deconstructing the oppositions).
Postmodernism is `the ghost in the machine' of sociology which pervades its oppositions: it cannot be appropriated totally without destabilising the regime, but it cannot be exorcised either - it inhabits sociological concepts thereby precluding a comfortable existence for arrogant sociologists.
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