What are the characteristic features of political attitudes in the Soviet Union? Are there any dominant elements? How do we identify their peculiarities? Is it possible to reveal patterns of aggregation or correlations? The main purpose of this paper is to find preliminary answers to these questions.
It is well known, that one of the most important features of the Soviet Union today is the speed of social change. Concrete decisions in economics, changes in the political, ideological and socio-cultural spheres, which in the `pre-perestroika' period required years, now take place very quickly. This, to some extent, limits the predictive possibilities of research and the possibilities of large scale generalisations. Also it is useful to note that this comparatively short period which began in the Soviet Union in spring 1985 has yet to run its course.
To comprehend the results of the social transformation it is necessary to take into account the historical context of its development. This concerns to a considerable extent such a relatively short period in historical perspective as the last five years.
Different types of research problem require different periodisations. For example, in political science there are periodisations based on decisions of the state which had a major political influence as well as repercussions in other areas of social life. One of the assumptions of the present research is that during the last five years there has been a cumulative change in political attitudes, which has affected socio-economic and cultural patterns of life.
In terms of official policy it is possible to divide the perestroika period into three:
The following important political events may be singled out in each of these stages. The first stage was characterised by the advances in glasnost, accelerated development in the second part of 1985; the CPSU 27th Congress and its ideas of new political thinking; and the CPSU Central Committee Plenum of January 1987, where policies for democratisation in all spheres of life were adopted.
In the second period it is possible to single out the 19th CPSU Conference and its decisions about the intensification of political reforms (July 1988); the rapid replacement of senior politicians (of the 1985 Politbureau members, only three remained in office by the end of 1988); the development of the People's Front and other socio-political movements; the activities of the First Congress of Peoples' Deputies; and the creation of the Supreme Council of the USSR.
The third stage has seen the election campaigns and the activities of the reformed republican and local councils; the beginning of the formation of a multi-party system; the formation of different polical platforms inside the CPSU; the 28th Party Congress (July 1990); and growing ethnic conflicts over almost all the whole country.
It is helpful to link these stages with economic changes. During the first two years of the perestroika period in the economic sphere the accent was on the improvement of discipline and the optimisation of economic management. The next three years (1988-90) were characterised by the implementation of reforms including the State Enterprise and Cooperative Laws.
Economic performance during this period has been variable. The economy had grown at an average 3.2% per annum between 1981 and 1985. In 1986 the figure was 4.1%, compared with 2.3% for 1987 and 4.4% for 1988. In 1989 the figure was 3.0%, though this falls to 2.4% if allowance is made for price increases.1 The results of the first year of reform might have looked hopeful had it not been for a sharply worsening supply of consumer goods and increased market shortages. In the middle of 1989, with social tensions rising, there was a slump in production and the wide-scale rationing of essential goods began. Foreign currency credits kept on growing. During the same period politicisation of the economic increased, as did processes of regionalisation.
The comparative results of enquiries in Moscow in 1989 and 1990 showed the following tendency. Most respondents in all occupational groups (up to 80%) noted a serious deterioration of the situation during the previous year in areas such as the supply of consumer goods, local transport, medical services, and growing crime rates. At the same 40% of respondents remarked that in 1980-90 their salaries and wages had increased. According to more than half the respondents the reconstruction process did not satisfy their standard of living aspirations.2
In the context of the analysis of political attitudes it will be useful to take into consideration some features of the evolution of political movements and the activity of the mass media. From the end of 1986 dozens, and later hundreds, of informal groups came into being all over the country, particularly in large towns. The aim of their activities consisted in the elaboration of alternative ideas aimed at strengthening the reconstruction process. Between late 1987 and mid-1988 these formations became institutionalised as socio-political movements, people's fronts, and democratic unions.
The process of formation of new political parties was promoted by several factors. Among these was the growth of political activity, the weakening of political and administrative censorship, legitimation of new forms of property, the emergence of ethnic self-consciousness and a growth in ethnic conflicts. This process was particularly rapid in the Baltic republics and Georgia, where up to the second half of 1988 up to a dozen parties appeared. In the Russian Federation an analagous process took place in the second half of 1990.3
With greater openness and access to information, these events were discussed in the mass media. A broadening of the range of problems discussed and points of view expressed (`pluralism' in the official vocabulary) was apparent. A new features press was created in 1990 when media legislation was adopted by the Supreme Council. There was a rapid expansion in the number of published titles, a diversification of political orientations, and the appearance of private publishers.
In the context of the analysis of political attitudes in the Soviet Union today, it will be useful to take into consideration some basic theoretical notions, which have a bearing on this particular area of research.
Among the major premises of the analysis of political consciousness is a notion that members of society can be defined according to certain groups. These groups must be distinct from one another and be internally homogeneous. In this case one can speak about types or typologies of political attitudes. From now on the term `attitude' will be used to signify a broad evaluative orientation towards an object (Oskamp 1977).
One other important issue concerns the existence of different approaches to the explanation of changes in political attitudes. Several types of explanation have been put forward by sociologists and political scientists.
A life cycle type of explanation sees changes in attitudes as a function of a person's age. It is based mainly on the analysis of the evolution of age groups, and on the transformation of their political outlooks. A natural science explanation relates to the composition of social groups. Political attitudes are defined here as a function of change in the proportion of group members with a particular view (Putnam 1973). According to Inglehart (1971) an individual is especially susceptible to new ideas in adolescence and is likely to retain these in later years. Another type of explanation was proposed by Kavanagh (1985). His concept of `period effect' synthesises elements of the previous theories, based on the assumption that in real life it is too hard to distinguish the influence of different factors. So the most effective way is to combine different types of explanation in the analysis of political attitudes. For an adequate understanding of these issues we must note the fact that most of them reflect an existing consensus in society on basic political values.
In research into the genesis and transformation of political attitudes, different disciplines put an accent on different determining factors. Among the most important of them are: social background, political context and personality. The psychological approaches to the study of political personality (Adorno, Rokeach) lie outside the scope of the present study.
Another important aspect in the theoretical background concerns the traditional trichotomy which divides the political spectrum into liberal, conservative and moderate subgroups. However, despite the widespread use of this trichotomy in political debate, the sociology of political attitudes has developed a somewhat more complex picture. While the conservative/liberal dimension can be put to good use in empirical analysis of certain aspects of political life, the growing complexity of social life and the appearance of new alternative lifestyles and social arrangements make it necessary to move on from this simple classification, to take into account other dimensions of political attitudes. Three major subject areas to which these dimensions relate are economic, social and racial. Analysis of the complexity of the structure of political attitudes, was developed empirically in great depth by Fleishman (1986).
In the sociology of political attitudes methodological aspects of research have also received a considerable amount of attention. It has been shown, that the observed structure of belief systems depends to some extent upon the nature of the investigation technique: how concrete terms are operationalised, and wording of questions. Cognitive limits also play an important role \*- the way different people interpret the same political and ideological issues (Bishop 1978).
Data came from research into the political situation carried out in Moscow in April-May 1990, by the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences. The exploratory character of the investigation determined the use of a quota sample, although cheapness and administrative convenience were also important. The survey represents the adult population (from sixteen and above) in the following occupational categories: office workers, engineers and other technical workers, humanitarian intelligentsia, natural science researchers, students and secondary school graduates. An empirical data set was generated in the Kalininsky region of Moscow \*- a typical area of the city. The total number of respondents was 480. Completed individual questionnaires were collected in a supervised group setting. This guaranteed a high response rate (90%) and a low level of missing values.
The questionnaire incorporated many topics around which political debates have centered during the last year. Besides this it included several questions which reflected the level of awareness and support for new political movements and organisations; use of the printed media; the level of respondents satisfaction with different spheres of their life; the level of shared values certain values; and socio-demographic and various other objective characteristics.
To construct a typology of political attitudes one needs to select certain procedures from a range of available statistical methods of classification such as factor analysis and cluster analysis. Factor analysis is a technique for condensing many variables into a few underlying constructs (factors). It relies on stringent data requirements. In contrast, cluster analysis make fewer assumptions. The main aim of the procedure reported here is to identify homogeneous groups or clusters. Cluster analysis is very suitable for solving current problems in which the boundaries of political groupings are fluid, and where it is difficult to identify in advance the sources of attitude variables, as it is in today's very unstable and uncertain political situation.
The classification procedure involved two stages. In the first stage 25 variables were selected. These variables represent a selection of different political views, published recently by the media. The procedure of quick clustering was then applied. The quick cluster algorithm produces clusters by finding cluster centres based on values of cluster variables and by assigning cases to the centres that are nearest. This procedure is used for efficient clustering of cases in the required number of groups. Often there is no single, meaningful cluster solution, but many, according to what is of interest. After a number of trials we chose eight clusters in order to obtain a statistically reliable number of respondents in each cluster. To determine how well-separated individual pairs of clusters were, the distance between final clusters centres was taken into consideration. The cluster solution depends on the order of cases in the file. To minimise the discrepancy we ran the cluster procedure six times. It became evident that it was possible to form clusters on the basis of ten variables. Means for each variable within each cluster were calculated (see Table 1).
Table 1. Variable Means for Clusters 1-6
_
Cluster Variable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
_
1 (n=106) 4.2 4.3 2.0 2.5 4.2 1.8 1.7 4.4 3.9 2.8
2 (n=60) 2.3 3.9 3.3 3.1 3.6 2.9 2.7 4.1 2.2 3.2
3 (n=60) 2.0 2.0 4.2 4.7 2.2 4.3 4.1 2.8 2.0 4.0
4 (n=91) 4.2 3.9 3.7 4.2 3.7 4.1 3.6 4.2 3.4 4.1
5 (n=94) 3.3 2.9 3.2 3.9 3.1 3.4 3.3 2.5 3.0 3.8
6 (n=49) 3.4 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.9 3.7 3.1 3.2 2.6 2.8
_
In brackets are the total number of cases in each cluster. Clusters 7 and 8 were eliminated from the analysis because of the small number of cases.
The variables were responses on a five point scale (1=`strongly disapprove, 5=`strongly approve') to ten statements which can be summarised as follows:
The characters of the clusters generated in this analysis are as follows:
Cluster1. `Economic and political radicals' or `Total radicals'.
Compared with other groups these people actively favour: privatisation as an effective mechanism for solving economic and social problems, the necessity of destroying socialism and the immediate resignation of the CPSU from power. They stand for radical types of reforms but do not look to their own group for a way forward. They also evaluate the previous period negatively.
Cluster 2. `Economic radicals'.
Representatives of this cluster support more than half of the items which people in cluster 1 support, though less strongly. Members of cluster 2 are nearly neutral on the question of the rapid resignation of the CPSU and are slightly opposed to regarding democracy as the highest value.
Cluster 3. `Gradual reformists on the basis of socialism'.
The characteristics of this cluster are the opposite of those of cluster 1. These respondents are strongly against privatisation and its consequences and of utilising models of western-type development. They disapprove totally of rejecting the experience of the previous period, adhere to socialist ideals, and oppose radical reforms.
Cluster 4. `Moderate reformists'.
This cluster occupies a middle position between representatives of cluster 1 and cluster 2. On the one hand it contains those who, like people in cluster 1, have a strong negative evaluation of the previous period and who stand for privatisation. On the other hand, despite their support for the idea of the destruction of socialism they are against the deliberate resignation of the CPSU from power as well as the rapid implementation of reforms.
Cluster 5. `Economic sceptics'.
This cluster contains people who are neither in favour of, nor opposed to, most issues offered. Two evident features of this cluster are the necessity to take into account the growing level of economic inequality as the outcome of the reforms, and are unwilling to put forward their own strategy for the development of the country.
Cluster 6. `Political sceptics'.
In many respects this cluster is similar to cluster 5. Its particular characteristics are the following: members are slightly opposed to seeing democracy as the highest value and are opposed to the rapid resignation of the CPSU.
It is important to notice that all clusters recognise and accept change, but differ over the best way to achieve it.
The focus of the present analysis concentrates on groups of employees, students and graduates of secondary schools. The employee group consists of engineers, servicemen, and members of the intelligentsia. Among other demographic characteristics which affect inclusion in the specification of cluster differences are gender, education, age, income and family status.
Analysis of crosstabulations show that clusters differ significantly in age (x=106.7, df=56, p<0.0001). It seems interesting to compare in this respect differences between cluster 1 and cluster 3, members of which have the most opposite political outlooks. In the age group below 30 one can find members with a radical reformist outlook (cluster 1) twice as often as members with a `step by step' reform-outlook (cluster 3). In the age groups between 30 and 50 the pattern is slightly different. In the older age groups the ratio between these groups again achieves the level of 2:1. This tends to contradict the general view that older people are more likely to favour traditional social arrangements.
Differences in educational background also appear to have some influence on cluster membership. 40% of those in clusters 1 and 4 have secondary education, compared with 10-20% for the other clusters. 35% of those with secondary education belonged to cluster 4. Those with higher education were approximately equally distributed between clusters 1,3,4, and 5 (19-23%), compared with 6% and 8% respectively for clusters 2 and 6.
There are no statistically significant differences between occupation groups in their relationship to the political attitude clusters, apart from students, whose distribution reflects the effects of age. Gender is only important in cluster 1, with twice as many females as males, and in cluster 3 with the opposite sex ratio. Cluster 1 also contains the highest proportion of those who have no children and who are divorced.
Income also varies with cluster membership. Those with incomes of less than 100 rbls are distributed equally between clusters. The majority of those with incomes of 100-200 rbls consisted of radicals, moderate reforms and political sceptics - 20%, 26% and 20% respectively. In the group of those with incomes of 200-300 rbls, the radicals (26%) are again the largest group, with a minority (7%) supporting socialist ideas. Most of those earning more than 200 rbls belong to the radicals and sceptics (21%, 21%, 26% and 21%), with no socialists.
The clusters also differ with respect to 'subjective' variables, relating to the living conditions of respondents. Cluster differences have a relatively high significance first of all in respect of the level of satisfaction with standards of living. Of those who are partly or totally dissatisfied, 25% belong to members of cluster 1, 13-16 per cent belong to each of clusters 2-5, and 8% belong to cluster 6.
Members of clusters also differ in their attitudes to other social issues, including freedom (seen as equal opportunities for everyone); the environment; high stands of living; and national independence. In comparison with other clusters, freedom is more important for members of clusters 1,2 and 6, and high standards of living are especially important for members of clusters 2 and 4. For members of cluster 3 this issue is less important. State independence is most important for cluster 3 members and less important for the others. The environment is more pronounced as an issue among members of cluster 6.
There is a relationship between cluster membership and perceptions of the present socio-economic situation. Supporters of radical reform are more often among those who express certain satisfaction that positive changes are taking place - they form 39% of cluster 1, 23% of cluster 4 and 10% of the others. Members of clusters 1 and 4 also tend to agree with the view that in the near future the socio-economic situation will fundamentally improve (25 and 28% respectively).
Members of cluster 5 were twice as likely to doubt the possibility for improvement in the situation by democratic means. Members of clusters 5 and one were nearly twice as likely to express indignation and willingness to change the present situation by any means. In this context such features of people's current mood as `let there be less democracy but more order' also seems to be of importance. Members of cluster 4 are slightly more active in favouring this statement (28 percent); the middle position is occupied by members of clusters 3,5, and 6 (18-20%); while members of clusters 1 and 2 show little support for it (11 and 5% respectively).
It appears that support for the idea of changing the situation by any means in one group of respondents, or the desire for more order in the other group, reflects more general characteristics of the existing attitude system. Apparently, it reflects a tendency to see the situation in `black and white', which means that many people support solving problems by radical methods. This is confirmed by the response of respondents to the statements "the economy must be either strictly planned or exclusively market based"; "the failure of perestroika is a result of indecisiveness and lack of radical activity both in political and economic spheres". The distribution of responses shows that 80 and 79% respectively of the total number of respondents partly or completely agree with these statements. The high level of agreement not only by members of cluster 1 (radicals) but also by members of other clusters (excluding cluster 3) confirms the broad popularity of this kind of attitude.
For an adequate analysis of this pattern it is important to define the level of awareness of respondents of the activities of actual organisations. The majority of them appeared on the political scene and were institutionalised during the last five years. Respondents were offered a list of 21 new political organisations and asked to list those whose activities they knew about. The data show what there is no significant difference in knowledge between clusters or socio-demographic groups. The organisations themselves can be divided into three groups on the basis of public awareness.
The first group includes organisations of which more than 50% of respondents are aware: Democratic Russia Block (65%); Democratic Platform in the CPSU (53%); Memorial (53%); Democratic Union (50%); Ecology/Green Party (58%); Pamyat (70%). The second group are recognised by between 20 and 50% of respondents. It includes: Peoples Front of Russia (37percent); United Workers' Front (25%); Liberal-Democratic Party (24%). The third group consists of organisations about which not more than 20 percent of respondents know. Constitutional Democrats (19 percent); Russian Patriotic Movements Federation (15%); Moscow Tribune (12%); Christian Patriotic Movement (12%); Social-Democratic Association (10%); Workers Union (5%); Scientific Communism Association (5%).
Analysis of the support for these organisations by respondents (at least through shared proclaimed political ideas) reveals a relatively low level of political involvement. The groups whose ideas are most widely supported are the Democratic Russia Block (27%) Green Party (35%); and the Democratic Platform in the CPSU (20%).
Certain points are worth noticing here. Several organisations exist, the level of recognition of which is rather larger than their level of support. In particular, there is Pamyat: 70% know about its activity but not more than 4% support it. The high levels of awareness of, and support for, the Green Party reflect, probably, the urgent preoccupation of people with ecological problems - during the period of enquiry there was no broad, influential and institutionalised green movement at all, whilst all of these organisations paid attention to ecological problems in their programmes. But it is also significant that one third of respondents do not support any of these organisations.
Analysis of this issue within clusters reveals that members of clusters 2 and 6 are characterised by a low level of political attachment to certain organisations. Inside these clusters we can find supporters of a broad variety of organisations, but their activity is relatively low. In contrast one can find an orientation to definite political organisations among members of other clusters. Thus adherents of radical reforms (cluster 1) tend to be supporters of such organisations as Democratic Russia Block, Russian Peoples' Block, Memorial , Democratic Union and Green Party. Members of cluster 4 (moderate in their political attitudes) are more eager to pport Democratic platform in the CPSU and Peoples Russia front . Those who stand for gradual reforms have a tendency to support more often the Block of patriotic movements of Russia, and Otechestvo. Members of cluster 5 are more eager to support the Green Party.
We can find out some more information about existing political attitudes through people's attitudes to political leaders. Respondents were asked to name up to three leaders who they thought would promote the country's development. The responses varied between clusters. Gorbachev was named by 25-26% of clusters 4 and 5, compared with 12-16% in clusters 1, 3 and 6, and 7% in cluster 2. Ryzkov was named most often by cluster 4 (36%) and cluster 3 (22-23%. Gorbachev's popularity is fairly evenly distributed between clusters, despite differences in political attitudes.
Politicians such as Yeltsin, Popov, Tankevich, Afanasiev, and Sobchak are more popular among the supporters of radical reforms: they were each named by between 40 and 50% of cluster 1. Members of cluster 2 named roughly the same people, but less often (13-16 per cent). It should be noted that a third of each cluster said that none of the political leaders attracted them.
It is generally agreed that during the reconstruction period the most important, perhaps the decisive, role in the realisation of glasnost policy was played by the mass media, especially the press. They support a variety of different views, and many of them are opposed to the official position. In order to find out which of them are seen regularly by respondents, they were given a list of the most popular central newspapers and magazines: the newspapers included Pravda, Moscovskya Pravda, Soviet Russia, Komsomolskya Pravda, Moskovsky Komsomolez, Izvestia, Moscow News, Trud, Literaturnya Gazeta, Arguments and Facts, Literaturnya Russia, Nedelya, Sovetskya Culture, Rabotchya Tribune, Krasnya Zvezda. The magazines included : Novy Mir, October, Moscow, Neva, Znamya, Nash Sovremennik, Avrora, Dryjba Narodov, Slovo, Ogonjok, Rodina, Molodya Gvardia, Unost, Vek XX and Mir, Inostrannya Literature.
The results of the analysis reveal the high level of audience size of newspapers. Nearly 95% regularly read at least one newspaper. The differences in distribution between clusters are as follows:
A relatively large group within each cluster (15-20%) reads Arguments and Facts. Members of clusters 2, 5, and 6 pay roughly equal attention to a group of middle-of-the-road newspapers. Members of clusters with more precisely defined political attitudes tend to concentrate on fewer newspapers. Supporters of radical reform constitute 30-35% of the readership of Moscow News, Moscovsky Komsomolez, and Soviet Culture. Cluster 4 members (moderates) read other titles: Pravda, Moscow Pravda, and Soviet Culture; members of cluster 5 (supporters of gradual change) more often pay attention to Sovetskya Russia and Literaturnya Russia.
The total readership of magazines is nearly 70%. (This comparatively high figure may be a function of, among other factors, limitations in the sampling.) Members of all clusters pay equal attention to Ogonjok. Among the readership of such magazines as Novi Mir, Znamya, Unost, Drujba Narodov, Neva are nearly 30 percent of the `radical reformers' (cluster 1). Those with the opposite political views (cluster 5) provide much of the readership of such magazines as Moscow and Nash Sovremennic. Cluster 5 are also more likely to read Inostrannya Literature. The data do now show any great differences between clusters 2, 4 and 6, though cluster 2 has a low level of readership of all the magazines mentioned above.
Our research has several findings which provide additional information on the current political situation in the Soviet Union.
Fleishman, J.A. (1986) Types of Political Attitude Structure. Results of Political Analysis. Public Opinion Quarterly. 50: 371-85.
Kavanagh, D. (1983) Political Science and Political Behaviour. Boston: Allen and Unwin.
Inglehart, R. (1971) The Silent Revolution in Europe: International Change in Postindustrial Societies. A.P.B.R. 65: 991-1013.
Oskamp, S. (1977) Attitudes and Opinions. Inglewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
Putnam, R. (1973) The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflict, and Democracy in Britain and Italy. New Haven: Yale University Press.
U. S.S.R. Academy of Sciences (1990) Sociological Research of Mass Political Consciousness and Problems of New Political Thinking. Moscow: Institute of Sociology.